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FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE BY SMALL CORPORATIONS
Since the passage of federal securities legislation in the early 1930's,
extensive financial disclosure has been required of large publicly-held cor-
porations.' Periodic disclosure requirements extend to all corporations
which are listed on a national exchange, 2 or have over 500 shareholders
and assets of at least one million dollars, 3 or have over 300 shareholders
and have registered a security under the Securities Act of 1933. 4 Most
corporations not governed by the federal securities acts have no state
statutory duty to periodically inform their shareholders of their financial
condition. 5 Presumably, the shareholders could require such periodic dis-
closure by resolution, 6 but this power is nowhere expressly recognized, nor
are instances of it recorded in reported cases. The corporation's only duty
then is to open its books or deliver statements to shareholders upon
demand.7
This note will focus upon the desirability of compelling financial dis-
closure by corporations not subject to control under the existing federal
securities legislation, which includes the vast majority of American corpo-
1 See generally 2 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION ch. 6 (2d ed. 1961). The Securi-
ties Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. (1970), requires copious financial and gen-
eral business disclosure pursuant to the registration and sale of securities. Disclosure
by corporations with outstanding securities is mandated by the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934. 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (1970).
2 15 U.S.C. § 781(a) (1970).
3 15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (1970).
4 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d) (1970).
5 See generally part I infra.
6 In light of the principle that shareholders may take action on matters properly
within their concern, see, e.g., Auer v. Dressel, 306 N.Y. 427, 118 N.E.2d 590 (1954),
it would seem that the shareholders of a corporation have the power to compel dis-
closure through the adoption of a proper resolution at a duly called meeting. Blum-
berg, The Public's "Right to Know": Disclosure in the Major American Corporation,
28 Bus. LAW. 1025, 1052-53 (1973). Cf. SEC v. Transamerica Corp., 163 F.2d 511
(3d Cir. 1947), where the court found that a proposal to have a report of the pro-
ceedings at the corporation's annual meeting sent to every shareholder was a proper
subject for a shareholder proposal under the SEC Proxy Rules. The court said,
Certainly it is proper for the stockholders to desire and to receive a re-
port as to what transpired at the annual meeting of their company. True
it may cost Transamerica $20,000 annually, but accurate information
as to what transpires respecting the corporation is an absolute neces-
sity if stockholders are to act for their joint interest. If stockholders
cannot act together they cannot act effectively.
Id. at 517-18.
7 See notes 15-17, 24 and accompanying text infra.
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rations." While differing in degree and extent of application to corporations
of varying sizes, the benefits derived from disclosure by large, widely-held
corporations would also be obtained when disclosure is made by smaller,
less widely-held corporations. The extension of federal or state disclosure
requirements to corporations of all sizes and ownership dispersions,
requiring them to place financial information before their shareholders at
least once each year, is suggested.
I. EXISTING DISCLOSURE LAWS
The major source of disclosure requirements is the federal securities
legislation. 9 Because their applicability is defined in terms of corporate size,
these requirements do not extend to the majority of American corpora-
tions. 10 State statutes are generally "enabling" rather than restrictive."I
They permit corporations to disclose financial data, but do not require such
disclosure. Only six states require that a domestic corporation send an
annual financial report to its shareholders, 12 and in three of those states
some or all corporations can avoid the requirement by enacting a by-law to
that effect. 13 In two other states there is a requirement that all domestic
8 See Conard, The Corporate Census: A Prelininary Exploration, 63 CALIF. L. REV.
440 (1975); REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS OF THE SECURITIES
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, H.R. DOC. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 19-20
(1963) [hereinafter cited as SPECIAL STUDY]. Professor Conard's statistics indicate
that less than 1 percent of the corporations in the United States have sufficient
shareholders to bring them within the limits of required disclosure.
9 See notes 1-4 and accompanying text supra.
10 See notes 2-4, 8 and accompanying text supra.
11 See W. CARY, CORPORATIONS 9-13 (4th ed. 1969). The deficiency of state law in
the area of disclosure is pointed out by former SEC Commissioner Sommer.
Despite the mounting demand for disclosure to persons whose capital
finances enterprises, state laws are still, as they always have been,
singularly deficient in affording shareholders and investors effective
means of learning about the operations of the companies in which they
have invested or may wish to invest.
Sommer, The Annual Report: A Prime Disclosure Document, 1972 DUKE L.J. 1093,
1094.
12ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-127 (Supp. 1975) (effective July 1, 1976) (limited
to domestic corporations with more than ten shareholders); Ch. 682, § 7, Div. 1,
Ch. 15, 1501, [1975] Cal. Laws 108 (effective Jan. 1, 1977, replacing CAL. CORP.
CODE § 3006 (West 1955)); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-307, 334 (Supp. 1975);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.1901 (1973); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1.72 (1951);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1318 (1967).
In a very specialized setting, New York's Theatrical Syndication Financing Act,
N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 399-b et seq. (McKinney 1968), provides for continual dis-
closure by the producers of theatrical productions. A producer must submit a balance
sheet and a profit and loss statement prepared and certified by an independent public
accountant at least once a year to all investors and to the department of law of the
state of New York. See generally Schulman, Continual Disclosure in the Small
Public Company: Lessons from Broadway, 15 N.Y.L.F. 569 (1969).
13 Ch. 682, § 7, Div. 1, Ch. 15, 1501, [1975] Cal. Laws 108 (effective Jan. 1,
1977); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1.72 (1951); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15. § 1318 (1967).
A by-law requires a majority vote for passage in these states.
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corporations place a financial statement before their shareholders at annual
meetings.14
Several states require a domestic corporation to prepare an annual finan-
cial statement and distribute a copy of it to any shareholder who requests
one.15 Many states follow the lead of the Model Business Corporation
Act,16 and require only that a corporation send copies of its "most recent"
financial statements to any shareholder who requests them.' 7 None of the
provisions which require that the shareholder request a copy of the finan-
cial statement before the corporation must disseminate it mandate that the
corporation send updates of the report to the shareholder, and provisions
based on the Model Act do not even require that the financial report
initially sent be prepared within the past year. Several states have no
requirement that domestic corporations prepare or send a financial report
on its condition to shareholders or other persons requesting such
information.'8
When neither federal nor state law compels periodic corporate disclosure,
the incidence of such action is generally low. The Report of Special Study
of Securities Markets of the Securities and Exchange Commission (Special
Study) found that one-fourth of the actively-traded corporations studied
submitted no financial information at all to their shareholders.' 9 A New
14 Ch. 311, § 2-314, [1975] Md. Acts 65 (Corporations & Associations Supp. 1975);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.38 (Page 1964).
'5 GA. CODE ANN. § 22-613 (1970); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.45 (1973); LA.
REV. STAT. § 12:102 (1969); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit 13A, §§ 625(3), 626(8) (1974)
(applicable to corporations with more than twenty shareholders); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 14A:5-28 (1969); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 624(e) (McKinney 1963) (limited to
persons who have been shareholders for six months or who are, or have authoriza-
tion from, holders of at least 5 percent of any class of outstanding shares); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 55-37(a)(4) (1965); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.38 (Page Supp. 1974)
(with time limitation relating to the annual meeting); S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-16.25(c)
(Supp. 1974); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-716 (Supp. 1974); TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN.
art. 2.44(E) (Supp. 1974); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.43(1) (Supp. 1975).
16 ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 52 (1971).
17 ALA. CODE tit. 10, § 21(46) (Cum. Supp. 1973); ALASKA STAT. § 10.05.249
(1962); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-312 (1966); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-5-117 (1973);
IND. ANN. STAT. § 25.210 (Burns 1972); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271A.260 (Cum.
Supp. 1974); Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-3-99 (1972); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 15-2246
(1967); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 51-24-48 (Supp 1973); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19-51
(1960); ORE. REV. STAT. § 57.246 (1974); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 7-1.1-46 (1969);
S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 47-4-29 (1967); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10-47 (1973);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 1896 (Cum. Supp. 1972); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-47 (Cum.
Supp. 1973); WASH. REV. CODE § 23A.08.500 (1974); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 31-1-105
(Cum. Supp. 1974) (effective July 1, 1975); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 17-36.44 (1965).
18 These states are Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Kansas, Missouri, Nevada, and
New Hampshire.
19 SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 8, pt. 3, at 10-12. The Special Study drew its sample
only from corporations in which some trading interest had been shown. Hence, the
corporations represented in the sample had a greater average number of shareholders
than if they had been chosen without this qualification. Moreover, according to
Singhvi & Desai, An Empirical Analysis of the Quality of Corporate Financial Dis-
closure, 46 ACCOUNTING REV. 129, 132 (1971), there is a significant relationship
between the number of shareholders in a corporation and the quality of disclosure
made by that corporation. This would suggest that if the sample had been drawn
from all corporations the percentage of corporations which report no financial in-
formation would be greater.
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York state study of intrastate offerings by corporations which had an
average of one hundred shareholders revealed that only one-fourth of
them sent financial reports to their shareholders. 20
Most states require domestic corporations to hold an annual share-
holders' meeting,21 but Delaware authorizes the elimination of the meeting
if the holders of sufficient stock to take any action which is proposed to be
taken at the meeting consent to such action in writing.22 The elimination
of the annual meeting deprives shareholders of an opportunity to question
management and thereby gain insights into the financial condition of the
corporation. 23
Shareholders do enjoy a common law right, 24 often codified by
statute,25 to examine the books and records of a company in which they
own shares. This common law right is a qualified right. The demand by
the shareholder must be for inspection at a reasonable time and place and
for a proper purpose.
There is a growing trend toward greater disclosure from a larger number
of corporations. Recent actions by the Congress and the SEC, 26 by the
organized bar, 27 and by the corporations themselves 28 have all expanded
The Special Study also revealed that much of the disseminated information was
deficient in various ways which affected the validity and quality of the information.
20 See Schulman, supra note 12, at 585.
21 See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.1402 (1973).
22 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 228 (1974).
23 See Blumberg, supra note 6, at 1033-35; Cary, Federalism and Capitalism: Re-
flections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 669 (1974).
24 See, e.g., H. HENN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 199, at 395 (2d ed. 1970); Blum-
berg, supra note 6, at 1043-52.
25 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (Supp. 1968).
26 With the Securities Acts Amendments of 1964, Congress extended the authority
of the SEC in terms of both the number of firms required to file, and the quality
of disclosure required. The SEC has also enhanced the quality of disclosure re-
quired through its rulemaking power. In addition to the Special Study, supra note 8,
the SEC completed another extensive study of disclosure requirements in 1969.
U.S. SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS: A RE-
APPRAISAL OF ADMINISTRATIVE POLICY UNDER THE '33 AND '34 ACTS (1969) [herein-
after cited as WHEAT REPORT]. Most of the recommended changes from the study,
conducted under the direction of SEC Commissioner Francis M. Wheat, deal with
the quality and content of disclosure, but at least one writer feels that the response
to the Wheat Report portends further changes.
There is every indication that these changes [in response to the Wheat
Report] are only the beginning of what will be one of the major efforts
of the Commission in the years ahead. The ultimate goal is to drastically
increase the amount of information a company must disclose on a
continuing basis, the dissemination of the information, and the numbers
of companies required to make that disclosure.
Schoenbaum, The Relationship Between Corporate Disclosure and Corporate Re-
sponsibility, 40 FORD. L. REV. 565, 571 (1972).
27 The American Law Institute has proposed a securities code which would re-
quire registration and annual reporting by any corporation with 300 shareholders and
one million dollars in assets. ALI FED. SECURITIES CODE §§ 401, 601 (Tent. Draft
Nos. 1-3, 1974).
28 Some corporations have undertaken greater disclosure than presently required
by law. For example, corporations which have chosen to have their shares listed
on the New York Stock Exchange are subject to the regulations of the Exchange
as well as those of the SEC. See NYSE COMPANY MANUAL 18-34, 64-73, 89-104.
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the scope of disclosure by corporations. There is no indication, however,
that this trend is likely to extend to all corporations regardless of size unless
legislative action is taken.
The British experience in this area is of interest since British corporate
law made a significant step in the direction of disclosure in 1967.29 Former-
ly, small English corporations which attained the status of an "exempt
private company" were excused from making financial disclosure to their
shareholders. 30 In 1962, a parliamentary committee which had been study-
ing the corporate law recommended a series of amendments to corporate
law, expanding company disclosure requirements. 31 After considering the
arguments in favor of maintaining the exemption from disclosure for small
companies, 32 the committee recommended the abolition of the status of
"exempt private company," in effect removing this exemption.33
In 1967, Parliament adopted this recommendation and the status of
"exempt private company" was eliminated. 34 At present, all companies,
regardless of size, must make a detailed annual report to their share-
holders.3 5 In this report, they are required to disclose both financial and
nonfinancial information.36
Many corporations are voluntarily going beyond the requirements of both the Ex-
change and the SEC. See Gillis, Trends in Disclosure, 142 FIN. ANAL. J. 11 (1975);
Big Board Chairman Recommends More Corporate Disclosure, 93 PUB. UTIL. FORT.,
Jan. 17, 1974, at 41. The reported instances of voluntary disclosure all involve
corporations already subject to some required disclosure.
29 See generally Companies Act 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38; Companies Act 1967,
c. 81; Harris, Separate Treatment for Close Corporations: Lessons from England
and Australia, 17 AM. J. COMP. L. 194 (1969); Pickering, The Companies Act 1967,
1967 BRIT. TAX REV. 384 (1967).
3 0 Companies Act 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 129.
31 REPORT OF THE COMPANY LAW COMMITTEE, CMND. 1749 (1962) [hereinafter
cited as JENKINS REPORT].
Pickering, supra note 29, at 402, concludes that the principal features of the
report fall within the four categories,
extension of company disclosure requirements, a substantial widening
of the powers to check fraud, a new system of insurance business
supervision, and the abolition of the privileges which have been en-
joyed by the small companies.
32 JENKINS REPORT, supra note 31, § 59. at 20.
33 Id. § 63, at 22. See also id. § 15, at 3.
34 Companies Act 1967, c. 81, § 2.
35 English companies are required to place a profit and loss statement and a
directors' report before their shareholders at least once a year. Section 16 of the
1967 Act requires that the report contain information on the directors, their holdings,
and contracts with the corporations in which they have an interest. This section also
requires that the report contain information on the activities and assets of the
company. The report must also include information on average employment of
the company and aggregate compensation (§ 18), political and charitable contributions
over £50 (§ 19), and disclosure of facts on exports (§ 20). The corporation must
also disclose reimbursement paid to directors (§ 6) and salaries of officers who
receive more than £10,000 (§ 8).
36 See Pickering, supra note 29, at 388-92. One fact mentioned by the JENKINS RE-
PORT, supra note 31, § 57, at 19, which may have influenced the decision of the
committee to recommend the abolition of the exemption from disclosure is that
over 70 percent of the private companies in England had attained the status of
"exempt private company," thereby removing themselves from disclosure require-
ments. According to the report some of these companies were "not very small in
260 [VOL. 9:256
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II. PURPOSES AND BENEFITS OF DISCLOSURE
Several benefits are achieved by disclosure requirements. Publicity re-
sulting from disclosure has an obvious deterrent effect on the conduct of
management 7 Management's knowledge that its actions will be open to
scrutiny will have a benefi*cial effect on the character of those actions.38 In
the absence of disclosure nonmanaging shareholders are susceptible to
mismanagement and fraud perpetrated by those who are in active control of
the corporation. A vivid example is found in Holi-Rest, Inc. v. Treloar,39
where the plaintiff was induced by her employer to purchase 160 shares
in a corporation he had organized to own and operate a restaurant. 40
Plaintiff managed the restaurant for three years, all of which were very
profitable, and was compensated through wages and distribution of
residual earnings of the corporation. She then quit her job as manager. The
defendant hired a replacement, and also began drawing a salary himself.
The net income of the corporation dropped, and small losses were sus-
tained in two of the next four years.
The court found the defendant accountable to the corporation for dam-
ages caused by the use of corporate funds to repay personal debts, the
withdrawal and pocketing of corporate funds without formal shareholder
authorization, self-dealing contracts with other businesses in which he had
an interest, and drawing an excessive salary for himself. The court stated
that the defendant had "breached his fiduciary duty in several ways, and
operated the corporate affairs solely for his own benefit and not that of
Holi-Rest or its stockholders."'41 In addition, the court castigated the de-
fendant for attempting to buy out the plaintiff's interest in what the court
termed a "freeze-out. 42
Various types of shareholder victimization are demonstrated by this and
similar cases. Such abuses include excessive compensation paid without
membership or in capital or in the extent of their undertakings." A similar trend of
"going private," may be developing in the United States, as some corporations are
repurchasing their own shares, dropping the number of their shareholders below 300.
This allows the corporation to deregister with the SEC, thereby removing itself
from its disclosure requirements. See Note, Going Private, 84 YALE L.J. 903 (1975).
357 WHEAT REPORT, supra note 26, at 10-11; Schoenbaum, supra note 26, at 575-78.
Years before the enactment of federal securities legislation, Justice Brandeis rec-
ognized the value of disclosure in improving the character of men's actions.
Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial
disease. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric lights
the most efficient policeman.
L. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY 92 (1914).
38 Blumberg, supra note 6, at 1026; Cary, Corporate Standards and Legal Rules,
50 CALIF. L. REV. 408, 419 (1962).
39
-Iowa-, 217 N.W.2d 517 (1974).
40 Defendant Treloar retained 600 shares and it appears from the record that there
may have been eight other small shareholders. -Iowa at -, 217 N.W.2d at 520. It
does not appear that these other shareholders had any part in this action or that they
still held these shares.
41 -Iowa at -, 217 N.W.2d at 525.
42 Id. A freezeout is the elimination of some of the shareholders from the enter-
prise by those in control through the manipulative use of their superior position.
See F.H. O'NEAL & J. DERWIN, EXPULSION OR OPPRESSION OF BUSINESS Associ-
ATES § 1.01, at 3 (1961); 2 F.H. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 8.07, at 43 (1971).
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shareholder knowledge,43 improper failure to declare dividends,44 self-
dealing with the corporation, 45 and attempts to induce purchases or sales
of shares at inadequate or excessive prices.46 The comparatively small
number of appellate decisions, coupled with the potential for abuse, suggest
that these problems may be widespread but as yet undiscovered. All of
these activities rely upon concealment for their success because an informed
shareholder could seek judicial relief to curtail these practices. 47 Should
deterrence ultimately fail, disclosure at least benefits those who seek to put
a halt to prohibited activities through legal action.48 These activities will
often be revealed, either directly or indirectly, through required disclosures.
Disclosure also may forestall fraud perpetrated by management and other
43 See, e.g., Teren v. Howard, 322 F.2d 949 (9th Cir. 1963); Smith v. Dunlap,
269 Ala. 97, 111 So. 2d 1 (1959); Hackley v. Oltz, 105 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 1958); Fendel-
man v. Fenco Handbag Mfg., 482 S.W.2d 461 (Mo. 1972).
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 162(a)(1) allows deduction as a business expense only
of "a reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation for personal services
actually rendered." Arguably, this provides some protection for outside shareholders
since corporate management will be reluctant to withdraw money under the guise
of compensation without the corresponding benefit of a tax deduction. However,
the Treasury Regulations recognize that disallowance of a deduction for an amount
paid out does not necessarily result in the return of the payment to the corporation.
Treas. Reg. § 1.162-8 (1958). Moreover, in the absence of required disclosure by the
corporation, there does not appear to be any method by which shareholders are
assured of learning of the disallowance of any deduction.
44 See, e.g., Cole Real Estate Corp. v. Peoples Bank & Trust, -Ind. App.-, 310
N.E.2d 275 (1974).
In a small corporation, where the officers are often directors and substantial
shareholders, there is a conflict of interest between insiders (officers and directors)
and outsiders caused by the differences in tax treatment afforded to salaries and
dividends. Reasonable salaries are a deductible expense of the corporation. INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, § 162. Thus, salaries are paid for with "before tax" dollars. On
the other hand, dividends are not deductible by the corporation and, hence, must
be paid out of "after tax" dollars. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 161. Moreover, the
maximum tax rate applied to salaries is 50 percent, while the tax rate on dividends
may be as high as 70 percent. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1348.
Management will seek to obtain as much return on its investment as possible in
the form of salaries, both for tax reasons and because salaries are a legitimate
means of discriminating between insiders and outsiders. If the managing share-
holders are content with the return on their investment taken in the form of salaries,
they will be less likely to declare dividends which would benefit all of the share-
holders. See generally 2 F.H. O'NEAL, CLOSE Comu'oasiONS, supra note 42, § 8.08,
at 58.
45 See, e.g., Lawson v. Baltimore Paint & Chemical Corp., 347 F. Supp. 967 (D. Md.
1972); Tansey v. Oil Producing Royalties, Inc., 36 Del. Ch. 472, 133 A.2d 141
(1957).
46 See, e.g., Backus v. Kirsch, 264 Mich. 73, 249 N.W. 469 (1933); Von Au v.
Magenheimer, 126 App. Div. 257, 110 N.Y.S. 629 (1908); Walsham v. Stainton, 46
Eng. Rep. 268 (1863).
47 One of the prime problems for a shareholder seeking to bring an action for
fraud or mismanagement against management is lack of evidence. Hale, Prevention
by a Minority Shareholder of Waste and Mismanagement by the Majority, 33 Wis.
B. BULL. 15 (June 1960).
48 Cary, supra note 38, at 410-11; Comment, Disclosure as a Legislative Device,
76 HARV. L. REV. 1273 (1963).
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insiders in the purchase and sale of shares of stock. 49 This rationale under-
lies the Securities Act of 1933's provision for the registration of securities
prior to sale and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934's regulation of sales
and purchases by the corporation, officers, directors, controlling persons,
and other insiders. Disclosure puts the parties to a transaction on equal
footing with regard to information material to that transaction.
Disclosure is essential to producing a market value for a share of stock
which approximates as nearly as possible its intrinsic value. 50 Securities do
not have a readily apparent value. Rather, the price at which they are
bought or sold depends upon investors' estimates of the future earnings of
the corporation, 51 and such estimates are meaningful only when made by a
person fully informed about all relevant factors. The more information that
is available about the corporation, the closer the market price will be to the
intrinsic value.52
Disclosure aids in ensuring the efficient allocation of capital resources.
Availability of information is a basic prerequisite to the optimal operation
49 Blumberg, supra note 6, at 1038; Knauss, A Reappraisal of the Role of Dis-
closure, 62 MICH. L. REV. 607, 613-14 (1964); Schoenbaum, supra note 26, at
575-78.
50 Professor Francis defines "intrinsic value" as
the true economic worth of a financial asset. This true economic worth
depends on the earnings prospects of the firm, in light of anticipated
economic conditions. It is the "true value" of the security and is un-
affected by accounting variations or market disequilibriums (that is,
temporarily inflated or deflated security prices).
J. FRANCIS, INVESTMENTS: ANALYSIS AND MANAGEMENT 307 (1972).
Congress had this purpose in mind when it enacted the Securities Exchange. Act
of 1934.
No investor, no speculator, can safely buy and sell securities upon the
exchanges without having an intelligent basis for forming his judg-
ment as to the value of the securities he buys or sells. The idea of a
free and open public market is built upon the theory that competing
judgments of buyers and sellers as to the fair price of a security brings
about a situation where the market price reflects as nearly as possible
a just price. Just as artificial manipulation tends to upset the true func-
tion of an open market, so the hiding and secreting of important in-
formation obstructs the operation of the markets as indices of real
value. There cannot be honest markets without honest publicity.
Manipulation and dishonest practices of the market place thrive upon
mystery and secrecy. The disclosure of information materially im-
portant to investors may not instantaneously be reflected in market
value, but despite the intricacies of security values truth does find
relatively quick acceptance on the market.
H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1934). See also Knauss, supra note 49,
at 613-14; Schoenbaum, supra note 26, at 575-78.
51 See 1 A. DEWING, THE FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS 287-90 (5th ed.
1953); cf. J. FRANCIS, supra note 50, at 308.
52 Knauss, supra note 49, at 610.
The value of the SEC and its disclosure requirements has been questioned by cer-
tain economists who feel that because of the timing and the type of disclosure
insisted upon, with its emphasis on conservative accounting principles, the SEC
has had no important effect on the quality of the securities on the market. See, e.g.,
Benston, The Effectiveness and Effects of the SEC's Disclosure Requirements, in
ECONOMIC POLICY AND THE REGULATION OF CORPORATE SECURITIES 23 (H. Manne
ed. 1969); Stigler, Public Regulation of the Securities Market, 37 J. Bus. 117 (1964).
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of the market in allocating capital throughout the economy. Moreover, in
order for investors to allocate their savings efficiently, the parties to a
transaction must have extensive information on securities offered and
traded in order to assess available investment opportunities.53
As the notion of corporate social responsibility gains greater recog-
nition, 54 it is also noteworthy that disclosure serves to trigger investor and
public pressure with regard to such obligations. 55 With this realization of
the impact of corporations on American life has come a greater demand
for disclosure of information.56
III. EXTENSION OF DISCLOSURE TO
SMALL CORPORATIONS
A. Benefits
Since the passage of federal securities legislation, the incidence of abuse
by management tends to be concentrated in corporations which do not
This position is rebutted by those who feel that disclosure as required by the SEC
does help to ensure the coincidence of market value with intrinsic value, and that
the SEC has helped to reduce the incidence of market manipulation and breach
of fiduciary responsibilities by insiders. Friend & Herman, Professor Stigler on
Securities Regulation: A Further Comment, 38 J. Bus. 106 (1965); Friend & Herman,
The SEC Through a Glass Darkly, 37 J. Bus. 382 (1964).
Much of this debate has centered on corporations with a large number of share-
holders, whose shares are actively traded on a national exchange, and who are
consequently subject also to exchange regulation, see note 28 supra, and investor
inquiry not common in small corporations. Information obtained as a result of
SEC-required disclosure appears to be immaterial to the market because the in-
formation has been disseminated earlier as a result of this regulation or inquiry, or
voluntarily because the corporation knows that it will be required to disseminate
the information at a later date in any case.
53 See generally W. BAUMOL, THE STOCK MARKET AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY
(1965); J. FRANCIS, supra note 50, at 52-54; J. VAN HORNE, THE FUNCTION AND
ANALYSIS OF CAPITAL MARKET RATES 3-10 (1970). In this sense disclosure has a
more profound effect where the capital to be accumulated or invested is sub-
stantial. However, in order to achieve true allocative efficiency, it is necessary to
be concerned with the allocation of resources for even the smallest investors and
corporations.
54 See generally W. CARY, supra note 11, at 237-43; Blumberg, supra note 6;
Schwartz, Towards New Corporate Goals, Co-Existence with Society, 60 GEO. L.J.
57 (1971).
55 Blumberg, supra note 6, at 1025-26; Knauss, supra note 49, at 647-48; Com-
ment, supra note 48, at 1273-75.
Speaking of the role of disclosure as both a deterrent and a trigger for public
pressure, Blumberg says,
Conduct that will prove embarrassing, if disclosed, is avoided; the
possibility of future disclosure constitutes a major element in shaping
prudent current decision. Further, greater dissemination of the facts
inevitably leads to the development of more informed public opinion
and more effective public pressures. Disclosure is not only a preventive
but is an essential element in the public evaluation of corporate per-
formance and in the determination of appropriate objectives for reform.
Blumberg, supra note 6, at 1026.
56 See Blumberg, supra note 6. This demand has been for information ef both a
financial and nonfinancial character.
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disclose financial information on a regular basis. 57 If these corporations
were required to make disclosure to their shareholders, this incidence pre-
sumably would be lessened because there is little to indicate that dis-
closure requirements would not be as beneficial in deterring dishonest con-
duct in small corporations as it has been in larger corporations. 5 In addi-
tion, the process of preparing and disseminating financial information to the
shareholders each year serves as a reminder to corporate managers that
they are the agents and fiduciaries of the corporation and of all the share-
holders. 59
The absence of widespread markets for the shares of small corpora-
tions, 60 restricts the opportunity for the shareholder of such a corporation
to divest himself of his shares if the corporation pursues financial policies
with which he is dissatisfied. 61 To sell his interest, he must often make a
financial sacrifice.62 Moreover, many shareholders in both large and small
corporations are dependent upon the corporation in which they have
invested for employment, 63 but shareholders in small corporations often
have a relatively larger personal stake in the venture than do shareholders
in large corporations. 64 Due to their greater stake and the lack of a ready
57 SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 8, pt. 3, at 10. The Special Study surveyed every re-
ported case of fraud prosecuted under either securities act for a period of eighteen
months subsequent to January 1961. Of the 107 corporations against which actions
were brought, ninety-nine were corporations not subject to continuous reporting
requirements and sixty-five of these had never submitted anything to the SEC.
58 Cf. SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 8, pt. 3, at 7-10.
59 Often in close corporations management tends to disregard th2 corporation as
a distinct entity. See generally 2 F.H. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 42,
§ 8.02, at 2. In Holi-Rest, Inc. v. Treloar, -Iowa-, 217 N.W.2d 517, 521 (1974),
the court reports that Treloar testified,
Since the inception of this business, I have thought of this business as
being my own and have pretty well dealt with it as my own.
See also Baker v. Cohn, 42 N.Y.S.2d 159, 167 (Sup. Ct. 1942). This type of atti-
tude can result in disregard of shareholders' interests.
60 See generally 1 F.H. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 42, § 1.07, at 22.
See also Schwingle, Valuation of Closely Held Stocks, 100 TRUSTS & ESTATES 555, 557
(1961).
61 Schulman, supra note 12, at 599.
62 1 F.H. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 42, § 1.07, at 22. In part this
is due to the lesser demand for shares of small corporations, both because cautious
investors will be reluctant to invest in an enterprise without a market in which to
divest themselves of their shares, and because small corporations tend to be less
well-known than their larger counterparts.
63 See, e.g., Clark v. Dodge, 269 N.Y. 410, 199 N.E. 641 (1936) (upholding share-
holders' agreement requiring plaintiff to be retained as general manager). See gen-
erally 1 F.H. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 42, ch. 6.
64 In Galler v. Galler, 32 Il. 2d 16, 27, 203 N.E.2d 577, 583-84 (1964), the court,
speaking of a close corporation (which it defined as a corporation with few share-
holders and little or no trading) said:
While the shareholder of a public issue corporation may readily sell his
shares on the open market should management fail to use, in his
opinion, sound business judgment his counterpart of the close corpora-
tion often has a large total of his entire capital invested in the business
and has no ready market for his shares should he desire to sell. He
feels, understandably, that he is more than a mere investor and that his
voice should be heard concerning all corporate activity.
See also 1 F.H. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 42, § 1.07, at 21; Han-
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market in which to dispose of their shares, many shareholders in a small
corporation have a more compelling need for corporate disclosure than do
shareholders of widely-held corporations.6 5
Disclosure breeds overall investor confidence, 66 and aids in the formation
of capital. 7 Small as well as large corporations benefit from securities
markets in which people have confidence that their investments will be
managed responsibly and that the results of the corporation's operations
will be reported to them.68 Reporting, in this sense, becomes more vital for
small corporations attempting to instill investor confidence because in-
vestors are faced with a diversity of choice among small corporations when
making investment decisions. 69 Some of these are successful, well-managed
corporations, but are unknown to the investing public. Disclosure will make
investment decisions regarding these corporations easier.
Ascertaining the value of a share of stock through an examination of the
issuing corporation is a problem which faces those who trade in the shares
of either small or large corporations. Before the extension of federal dis-
closure requirements to unlisted securities, 70 it was recognized by both the
cock, Minority Interests in Small Business Entities, 17 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 130
(1968).
65 Cf. Schulman, supra note 12, at 599.
The argument that shareholders in small corporations lack access to markets in
which to divest themselves of their investment is not inconsistent with the argument
that sufficient trading goes on in the shares of some small corporations to justify
extension of disclosure on the rationale that it is necessary to protect those who
trade in such securities. See notes 70-75 and accompanying text infra.
In some corporations both of these characteristics are present. A significant amount
of trading exists, but not enough to ensure an escape route for dissatisfied share-
holders. Even in corporations where only one of these rationales applies, there is
still ample justification for requiring that disclosure be made to shareholders. Almost
by definition, every corporation, regardless of size, falls into one of these two
categories.
66 Feuerstein, The Corporation's Obligations of Disclosure Under the Federal
Securities Law When It Is Not Trading in Its Stock, 15 N.Y.L.F. 385, 403-04 (1969);
Manning, Response in ECONOMIC POLICY AND THE REGULATION OF CORPORATE SE-
CURITIES 85 (H. Manne ed. 1969).
Dean Manning's view is that in enacting the federal securities laws, Congress
may have been seeking to restore lost public confidence in the securities markets
and that all other rationales may have been secondary to this purpose. Manning,
supra at 85.
67 Feuerstein, supra note 66, at 403-04.
68 Arguably, in a small enterprise all the investors either know each other or
realize that they should be on the alert before and after investing. It seems unrealistic
to assume, however, that all the shareholders of any but the most closely held
corporations will be familiar with those who control the corporation. Moreover, the
more widespread are investor interest and confidence, the easier it will be to attract
capital.
69 SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 8, pt. 3, at 7-10.
70 Congress extended disclosure requirements to securities of corporations having
more than 500 shareholders and one million dollars in assets which are traded over
the counter through passage of the Securities Acts Amendments of 1964, Act of
August 20, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-467, 78 Stat. 565, amending 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq.
(1970).
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Special Study7' and commentators 72 that the value achieved by disclosure
in market trading of shares listed on the national exchanges could also be
achieved in trading of unlisted shares. 73 Whenever a share of stock is traded
at least two parties must in effect compute the value of the corporation,7 4
whether the corporation is large or small. Moreover, many small companies
are actively traded, 75 and even when a corporation's stock is inactively
traded, ready availability of information is necessary if trades are to be
made efficiently.
The social responsibilities of small corporations are not as commonly
recognized as those of larger corporations. There are corporations not
presently subject to disclosure, however, which strongly influence the eco-
nomic and social climate of this country.7 6 The Special Study found that,
especially in corporations with a small number of shareholders, there is no
significant relationship between number of shareholders and asset size.77
In fact, there are a significant number of large, well-known companies with
a sufficiently small number of shareholders to exempt them from required
71 The Special Study said,
The basic principles which impelled Congress to establish the disclosure,
proxy, and insider-trading protections for investors in listed securities
are equally applicable to the over-the-counter market. There is nothing
in the mechanics of the market place which calls for protection in one
case and not in the other. The need for accurate information as a basis
for investment decisions and as a bulwark against fraud and manipu-
lation, the desirability of providing a basis for at least minimum
corporate democracy, and the dangers of misuse by insiders of con-
fidential corporate information are as great in one as in the other.
SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 8, pt. 3, at 7-8.
72 See, e.g., Knauss, supra note 49, at 626.
73 Some indication that disclosure of financial information is beneficial in assess-
ing the value of shares of stock can be drawn from the fact that the ascertainment
of such value is considered a proper purpose for inspection of the corporation's books
and records. See, e.g., State ex rel. Rogers v. Sherman Oil Co., 31 Del. 570, 117 A.
122 (Sup. Ct. 1922).
74 Cf. Knauss, supra note 49, at 626.
75 One of the inquiries of the SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 8, pt. 3, at 20-23, was the
extent of trading in stock of corporations with varying numbers of shareholders.
Lacking more reliable data, the study used as its indicator of trading activity the
number of recorded transfers which took place during the year, realizing that
this figure was not completely accurate but believing that it would furnish a reliable
standard. The study found that it was not until the level of 200 shareholders was
reached that more than one-half of the corporations studied reported at least
twenty-five record transfers in the year. However, one corporation with less than
twenty-five shareholders reported between 200 and 499 transfers, and one corpora-
tion with fewer than 100 shareholders reported between 500 and 999 transfers.
The data contained in Table IX-a, id., pt. 3, at 21, shows that some record transfers
take place even in corporations with a small number of shareholders. Knauss, supra
note 49, at 626, interprets this data to indicate that "companies with 200 or more
shareholders should probably be included under the disclosure requirements."76 See note 78 infra. Until 1955. the Ford Motor Company had no public owner-
ship of its shares. All of the voting stock was held by members of the Ford family.
I F.H. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 42, § 103, at 7.
77 SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 8, pt. 3, at 26.
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financial disclosure.78 In these corporations, as well as the more typical
small corporation, monitoring of the actions of management should take
place. Shareholders are in the best position to perform that role79 but they
require information with which to undertake the task.80
Other benefits of an indirect nature would follow from the extension of
disclosure requirements to small corporations. Compulsory disclosure has
an impact on the quality and quantity of information contained in dis-
closures which are not required. 81 Large corporations which must make
accurate reports of specific information tend to also make accurate state-
ments in nonrequired disclosures, such as press releases and reports to
shareholders.82 In this way even minimal disclosure requirements can have
a substantial impact.
Although shareholders enjoy a common law right to inspect the books
and records of a corporation in which they own shares, 3 that right is not
a sufficient disclosure device even in a small corporation where inspection
is more feasible than in a large corporation.8 4 Management can often stall
or impede the progress of an interested shareholder, forcing him to resort
to action in the courts to compel the corporation to grant access to the
books.8 5 Moreover, exercise of the right requires affirmative action by the
shareholder, deterring exercise of the right in some cases.8 6 Required dis-
78 1 F.H. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 42, § 1.03, at 7. Sheehan,
There's Plenty of Privacy Left in Private Enterprise, FORTUNE, July 15, 1966, at
224, reports that there are a number of private companies, without public share-
holders, which would have qualified for "Fortune 500" listing based on sales except
for the fact that the list excludes privately-held and close corporations which do
not publish financial statements.
79 Professor Cary states, "Management's actions, however, should be disclosed
to and monitored by outside groups; as a practical matter this group should be the
shareholders." Cary, supra note 23, at 699.
80 Moscow, Aspects o Shareholders' Rights, 18 WAYNE L. REV. 1003, 1029 (1972).
81 See Gillis, supra note 28; Sommer, supra note 11, at 1096.
82 Sommer, supra note 11, at 1096.
83 See note 24 and accompanying text supra.
84 In general, a corporation with a small number of shareholders should have a
less complicated accounting system than one with a large number of shareholders
merely because of the size differential. But see notes 76-78 and accompanying text
supra.
85 See, e.g., Friedman v. Altoona Pipe & Steel Supply Co., 460 F.2d 1212 (3d Cir.
1972); Beebe v. Star-Stop, Inc., -- Colo.-, 521 P.2d 1263 (1974).
There have been proposals for legislation designed to eliminate this problem.
See, e.g., Starr & Schmidt, Inspection Rights of Corporate Stockholders: Toward a
More Effective Statutory Model, 26 U. FLA. L. REV. 173 (1974). Even if these pro-
posals did minimize management recalcitrance, the right of inspection is still not a
sufficient alternative to affirmative disclosure requirements. See note 86 and accom-
panying text in/ra.
86 Cf. Shareholders Show Scant Interest in 10-K, 42 FIN. EXEC. 8 (October 1974).
The Wheat Report, supra note 26, recognized that in order to improve the informa-
tional value of disclosure there was a need for insuring more effective dissemination
of filed documents.
The Study recognizes that it would be impractical to expand '34 Act
reporting requirements without first improving existing means of dis-
semination of those reports. The costs associated with obtaining copies
of the reports, together with their limited content, have contributed to
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closure would place financial information before all of the shareholders, not
simply those who chose to and could afford to avail themselves of the
inspection right.
Disclosure, however, should not completely supplant inspection, even
though its adoption would probably lessen resort to this right.87 Any infor-
mation disclosed will not be as complete as the information contained in
the books and records themselves, and some shareholders will always
desire this more comprehensive data. s 8 Inspection will also enable share-
holders to determine whether the information disclosed is accurate. 89
Where the information disclosed is not accompanied by the opinion of an
independent public accountant the availability of such verification may be
especially useful.90
B. Burdens
Several arguments have been raised in opposition to the extension of
disclosure requirements to small corporations." The most commonly
advanced, and probably the most persuasive, is that compliance with dis-
closure requirements would place a heavy financial and administrative
burden on the small corporation.92 For this reason the Special Study did
not urge the extension of federal securities regulation to corporations with
less than 300 shareholders. 93 However, required disclosure of a more sim-
plified nature than that considered by the Special Study would be less vul-
nerable to such an objection.
The cost of any disclosure requirement will vary with the type of prepara-
tion and degree of verification required. When this is coupled with the
variety of corporations, it becomes impossible to estimate with great cer-
tainty the dollar cost of required disclosure. However, it is reasonable to
estimate that the cost to a small corporation of having outside personnel
prepare financial statements could range from a few hundred dollars for
the preparation of a tax return and unaudited financial statements prepared
from this return, to several thousand dollars for the preparation of audited
financial statements accompanied by a public accountant's opinion regard-
a situation in which relatively meager use is made of the reports by the
financial community.
Id. at 34.
The cost and time involved in exercising the right to inspection, together with the
baffling complexity of financial records before they have been distilled and organ-
ized, further decreases the value of the right to inspection as a disclosure device.
87 N. LATTIN, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 349 (2d ed. 1971). But see NEV. REV.
STAT. § 78.257 (1971), which gives a statutory right of inspection to any 15 percent
shareholder but does not extend the section to the shareholder of any corporation
listed and traded on any recognized exchange or of any corporation which "fur-
nishes to its stockholders a detailed, annual financial statement."
88 N. LATTIN, supra note 87, at 349.
89 Id.
O See note 128 and accompanying text infra.
91 See, e.g., JENKINS REPORT, supra note 31, §§ 58-61, at 20-22; Benston, supra
note 52, at 64.
92 See Harris, supra note 29, at 204.
93 SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 8, pt. 3, at 17, 33-35.
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ing the financial statements. 9 4 In the former case, the marginal cost of
requiring financial statements prepared on the basis of a corporation's tax
return95 is minimal since the corporation must prepare and submit a tax
return even without the requirement of disclosure. In light of the expected
benefits of required disclosure, a slight burden on the corporation should
not be a sufficient argument to defeat the enactment of disclosure
requirements. 96
It is also argued that disclosure of the remuneration paid to officers and
directors, and other aspects of the affairs of small corporations, would open
up an essentially private matter to the view of the community.97 This argu-
ment may have validity in a purely family corporation, or one in which
the shareholders are all active in management, but loses some of its force
whenever there are outside shareholders. Whenever there are public share-
holders, those not actively involved with the day-to-day activities of the cor-
poration, it can be argued there is a greater need for the protective benefits
of required disclosure. 98 As a practical matter such information is already
available to shareholders, either through their right to inspect the corpora-
tion's books and records, 99 or through the right of a 1 percent shareholder
to examine the income tax returns of his corporation. 10 0 Ultimately, con-
sideration of this issue involves a balancing of the protections necessary for
outside shareholders against the interest of the corporation and corporate
officers in privacy. The Jenkins Committee implicitly resolved this in favor
of shareholder protection when it recommended the abolition of the
"exempt private company" in England.10 '
Finally, it is argued that there is a risk of "snooping" by competitors of
a small company, and that disclosure of items such as sales and net profit
margin of a small corporation might be used to great advantage by a larger
94 Telephone interview with a C.P.A., practicing in St. Paul, Minnesota, Dec. 25,
1975. His estimates are based on a familiarity with auditing procedures for both
large and small corporations.
95 See notes 129-33 and accompanying text infra.
96 Blumberg, supra note 6, at 1053-54, points out that the exercise of a sharehold-
er's right to inspection inevitably disrupts the operations of a corporation while the
inspection takes place since it requires physical marshalling of the books and
records of the corporation for the shareholder and requires corporate personnel to
supervise the inspection process. This must be done largely at the convenience of the
shareholder since the corporation must comply with the request for inspection within
a reasonable time.
An affirmative disclosure requirement would help to relieve this burden in two
ways. A system of annually required disclosure should lessen the incidence of the
exercise of inspection rights by shareholders. N. LATTIN, supra note 87, at 349. If
this is the case, then in making disclosure to its shareholders the corporation will
be able to control the inevitable disruption and allocate its resources more efficiently
in making the disclosure.
97 JENKINS REPORT, supra note 31, § 59, at 20-21; Benston, supra note 52, at 64.
98 See SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 8, pt. 3, at 17; cf. id. pt. 3, at 33.
99 See note 24 and accompanying text supra.
100 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6103(c).
101 JENKINS REPORT, supra note 31, § 63. at 22; Harris, supra note 29, at 204-5.
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competitor. 10 2 It can be countered that such a risk is minimal with respect
to the type of information required by proposals for financial disclosure, 03
but, if this risk is considered significant, it again becomes necessary to bal-
ance the interests of the shareholder and those of the corporation. This
argument, too, was implicitly rejected by the Jenkins Committee. 10 4 In any
case, if the competitor is intent upon gaining access to such information,
he can, under current law, become a shareholder of the corporation and
obtain information by exercising the right to inspect corporate books and
records or by inspecting the corporation's income tax return. 10 5 The fact
that the shareholder requesting information is also a competitor is not
enough in itself to defeat an otherwise valid purpose for inspection. 10 6 Even
if a competitor is not a shareholder, it may have access to this information
through a shareholder. 07
If the possibility that the information disclosed will be used by com-
petitors to their advantage or that the information is truly of a private
nature is considered significant, it would be possible to require that dis-
closure be made only to shareholders, 08 or to allow an administrative
agency or the courts to order the filed documents to be kept confidential
when cause is shown. 10 9 Disclosure only to shareholders does not eliminate
the possibility that such information will become public or fall into the
hands of competitors, but it would reduce the possibility of unnecessarily
broad public dissemination.
102 JENKINS REPORT, supra note 31, § 59, at 20; Benston, supra note 52, at 64.
103 See 1 F.H. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 42, § 3.63, at 90, which
concludes with respect to the right to inspect that the risk of snooping by competitors
is minimal in a close corporation.
104 See note 101 supra.
105 See notes 24, 100 and accompanying text supra.
106 Malone v. Dimco Corp., 68 Misc. 2d 610, 328 N.Y.S.2d 65 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
See also Susquehanna Corp. v. General Refractors Co., 250 F. Supp. 797 (E.D. Pa.
1966) (dicta as to the right to inspect corporate books and records since the petition-
ing shareholder only sought access to the list of shareholders). But see Hutson v.
Brown, 248 Ala. 215, 26 So. 2d 907 (1946) (competitor's purpose in seeking inspec-
tion improper); Slay v. Polonia Publishing Co., 249 Mich. 609, 229 N.W. 434 (1930)
(court found purpose of inspection by competitor to be improper).
107 Cf. State ex rel. Paschall v. Scott, 41 Wash. 2d 71, 247 P.2d 543 (1952). In
this case a shareholder of a corporation was denied a writ of mandamus to inspect
books and records relating to marketing practices, sales, and customers. She had
initiated contact with competitors of the corporation and intended to communicate
information she garnered from her examination to such competitors. The court felt
that she had an interest contrary to the best interests of the corporation and denied
her the writ.
108 In Michigan, every corporation is required to distribute a "statement of in-
come" to its shareholders at least once a year, but this statement is not required
as part of the report to be filed with the state and open to the public. Compare
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.1901 (1973) with MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§§ 450.1911, 450.1915 (1973).
109See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 24(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78x(b), which
authorizes the SEC to keep information confidential upon the written objection of the
filer. See also Rule 24b-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.24b-2 (1975)
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IV. PROPOSAL FOR DISCLOSURE
A proposal'1 0 that corporations of all sizes be required to mail a financial
statement to their shareholders within 120 days of the end of their fiscal
year was formulated in 1975 as a suggested amendment to section 52 of
the Model Business Corporation Act."1 This financial statement could be
prepared either on the basis of generally accepted accounting principles, or,
if the books of the corporation were not kept on that basis, then on the
same basis as that used to prepare the corporation's income tax return. 1 2
This proposal implicitly recognizes the value of financial disclosure by
small corporations, and is a step in the right direction, but a more extensive
disclosure requirement would have additional beneficial effects. For that
reason it is useful to consider the outlines of the more thoroughgoing dis-
closure proposal presented below.113
A. Contents of Financial Report
Shareholders in every corporation are entitled to financial information
through the medium of annually disseminated financial reports about the
corporation. With the limited exceptions described below, 114 every corpo-
ration should be required to report this information to its shareholders at
least once a year. The form of this report should be less elaborate than
SEC Form 10-K 115 and should resemble the annual reports presently pre-
pared by major American corporations covered by SEC rules. These
annual reports are recognized as being more widely read by the average
investor than are other required disclosures, 1 6 and it should be the goal
of disclosure to provide information which will come to the attention of
investors and serve a wide variety of their needs. 117 The contents of the
report should be clearly delineated so that corporate management knows
what it must disclose."18 By operating on this "bright-line" principle it will
11:0 Buxbaum, Stark & Scriggens, Memorandum to the Corporate Laws Committee
of the American Bar Association, Feb. 11, 1975 (rev. March 8, 1975) [hereinafter
cited as Buxbaum].
I" ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 52 (1971).
112 Buxbaum, supra note 110.
113 Another proposal to extend disclosure requirements to any "publicly-held"
corporation is contained in Schulman, supra note 12.
114 See notes 139-44 and accompanying text infra.
115 SEC Form 10-K, 17 C.F.R. § 249.310 (1975), cited in R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH,
SELECTED STATUTES, RULES AND FORMS UNDER THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS
483-95 (1975). If the form of the report were simplified, disclosure would be less of a
burden on the small corporation and the force of one of the arguments against dis-
closure in small corporations also would be lessened. See notes 92-96 and accompany-
ing text supra.
116 See Kant, The New Annual Report to the Shareholders, 20 VILL. L. REv. 273
(1975); Sommer, supra note 11, at 1097-1100.
117 SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 8, pt. 3, at 59-60. See Axelson, A Businessman's
Views on Disclosure, J. ACCTNCY., July, 1975, at 42-46. See generally note 86 supra.
118 Comment, supra note 48, at 1276.
Some of the state statutes which require the preparation of an annual report for
the shareholders are unclear as to the exact nature of the disclosure required. E.g.,
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 300.32 (1969) (the corporation "shall when required present to
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also be easier to evaluate the degree of management compliance.
The report should include items which go beyond those normally dis-
closed in the annual reports of major corporations in order to more fully
serve ,the purposes of disclosure. The following items should be considered
for inclusion in the contents of such a report:
1. A statement of the major activities of the corporation
and any changes in such activities. 119 The shareholder has
a right to know the areas in which his corporation is operat-
ing.
2. The identity of the executive officers and directors, the
stock holdings of each of these individuals, and the identity
of all shareholders whose interest exceeds a specified per-
centage.'20 The shareholder also has a right to know who is
in control of the corporation in which he has an interest.
3. A statement of profit and loss (income statement) and
a comparative balance sheet which accurately reflects the fi-
nancial condition of the corporation.1 21 This financial infor-
mation is the cornerstone of any disclosure requirement.
Many shareholders make their investment decisions solely
on the basis of financial information and it is here that mis-
management and shareholder victimization will often be
revealed. Financial information is also recognized as essen-
tial to a proper valuation of shares of stock. 12 2
4. The salaries paid to all shareholders who are officers
or directors of the corporation, and of all officers who
receive more than a specified amount. 12 3 If managing share-
holders wish to receive a larger return on their investment
to the exclusion of other shareholders they will often do so
through the vehicle of excessive compensation. 124 Share-
the stockholders written reports of its condition and business"); HAWAII REV. STAT.
§ 416-95 (Supp. 1974) (corporation required to file with the state an "exhibit of its
state of affairs").
119 See, e.g., SEC Form 10-K Item 1, 17 C.F.R. § 249.310 (1975), cited in R. JEN-
NINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 115, at 484.
120 See, e.g., SEC Form 10-K Items 8, 11, 12, 17 C.F.R. § 249.310 (1975), cited in
R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 115, at 489-90; Companies Act 1967, c. 81,
§§ 6, 8.
In a state which allows cumulative voting for directors this percentage should be
the least amount necessary to guarantee the shareholder the power to elect one
director. In other states this percentage must be set somewhat arbitrarily, since the
degree of control which one can exercise in a corporation varies with the size of
the corporation. In a corporation with only two shareholders a holder of 49 percent
of the stock can exercise little control. However, in a corporation with a larger
number of shareholders a much smaller holding of stock will often be sufficient to
exercise significant control.
121See, e.g., SEC Rule 14a-3(b)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(b)(1) (1975); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.1901 (1973).
122 See Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 CuM. BULL. 237.
123 See, e.g., SEC Form 10-K Item 13, 17 C.F.R. § 249.310 (1975), cited in
R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 115, at 490; Companies Act 1967, c. 81,
§§ 6, 8.
English companies must disclose the compensation of employees who receive over
£ 10,000 (approximately $20,000 at current exchange rates). SEC Form 10-K re-
quires the corporation to disclose each director whose remuneration exceeds $40,000
and the three highest paid officers whose remuneration exceeds that amount.
124 See notes 43-44 supra; Schwingle, supra note 60, at 557.
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holders should be informed of officers' and directors' com-
pensation so that.they can challenge excessive amounts.
5. A disclosure of all substantial transactions between the
corporation and individuals who are shareholders of the
corporation or corporations in which those individuals have
a substantial interest. 125 While many of these contracts will
withstand scrutiny, there are contracts which shareholders
will wish to attack on the basis of unfair self-dealing.
6. A calculation of "earnings per share" and "book value
per share. '1" -' 6 While these figures are largely the result of a
mechanical calculation, once the data on which they depend
are revealed, they are often used by investors as short-cut
indicators of performance.
7. A statement of the accounting standards used to keep
the books and prepare the statements. 121 In reading and
understanding these data it is essential that the shareholder
know the basis on which they are prepared.
8. A statement by an independent public accountant, or
the president or treasurer of the corporation, that the dis-
closed reports accurately reflect the financial condition of
the corporation. 12 8
B. Accounting Standards
Those corporations to which disclosure requirements will be extended
for the first time by this proposal need not necessarily be compelled to
keep their records in accordance with generally accepted accounting prin-
ciples (GAAP). 129 GAAP have the advantage of a large measure of con-
sistency developed by the SEC and the accounting profession over many
years,1 30 but it is also possible for the books and records to be kept in
125 See, e.g., SEC Form 10-K Item 15, 17 C.F.R. § 249.310 (1975), cited in
R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 115, at 492; Companies Act 1967, c. 81,
§ 16(I)(c).
126Earnings per share is a required disclosure on Form 10-K. SEC Form 10-K
Item 2, 17 C.F.R. § 249.310 (1975), cited in R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note
115, at 486.
127 This idea has been incorporated into the opinions of the Accounting Principles
Board.
When financial statements are issued purporting to present fairly
financial position, changes in financial position, and results of operations
in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles, a descrip-
tion of all significant accounting policies of the reporting entity should
be included as an integral part of the financial statements.
Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 22, 8, Disclosure of Accounting Policies
(April 1972).
128See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.38(B) (Page Supp. 1974). Such a
statement would be required by the proposal before the Corporate Laws Committee.
Buxbaum, supra note 110.
129One of the arguments against extending disclosure requirements to small
corporations is the burden that would be placed on them by requiring them to
conform to standard accounting practices. Harris, supra note 29, at 204.
130 See, e.g., Barr & Koch, Accounting and the SEC, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 176
(1959). See also Reg. S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210 (1975); Accounting Series Release,
17 C.F.R. § 211 (1975).
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accord with other standards which accurately reflect the financial condi-
tion of the corporation. 13 1
The proposal submitted to the Corporate Laws Committee of the
American Bar Association would allow the preparation of the financial
statements either on the basis of GAAP, or on the same basis as that used
for filing of the corporation's income tax return. 132 This would lessen the
burden of disclosure requirements on small corporations not currently
using GAAP, but would at the same time provide some measure of con-
sistency and uniformity for similarly situated companies. Since there are
differences in the standards sanctioned by these two methods,13" the state-
ments of a company prepared on the basis of GAAP would reflect certain
differences from a statement prepared by a similar, or even the same,
company on the basis of tax accounting standards. Resort to tax account-
ing standards, however, would eliminate any need on the part of the cor-
poration to keep two sets of books, one for use in the preparation of annual
reports to be disseminated to the shareholders and the other for tax
purposes.
It might be desirable to enact different standards for corporations of
different sizes. Many legislatures have recognized,"34 as often is evidenced
131 Maine requires that financial statements be prepared in accordance with sound
accounting practices:
3. Not later than 5 months after the close of each fiscal year, each
corporation which is not a close corporation [one with twenty or fewer
shareholders] shall prepare, in accordance with good accounting prac-
tices, a balance sheet . . . and a profit and loss statement ....
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13A, § 625 (1974). Cf. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.38(B)
(Page Supp. 1974).
Many states do not statutorily prescribe any standard for the financial reports
which are prepared. E.g., MIcH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 450.1901 (1973); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18, § 1.72 (1953).
132 Buxbaum, supra note 110.
133 See Carley, Important Areas in Which Book Accounting Differs from Tax
Accounting; Tax and Nontax Results; Requirements of Federal and State Regulatory
Agencies, N.Y.U. 26TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 541 (1968); Reimer, Major Differences
Between Net Income for Accounting Purposes and for Federal Income Taxes, 23
ACCTO. REV. 305 (1948).
A committee of accountants has recognized that such differences exist because
of the different functions of the two systems. Congress and the IRS are concerned
with the collection of revenue and other matters of fiscal policy. The accounting
profession and shareholders are interested in an accurate measure of business per-
formance. The committee felt that Congress should move towards the adoption of
GAAP for tax purposes as nearly as possible, but that notwithstanding the tax laws,
the accounting profession should continue to use GAAP in the preparation of
financial statements. Committee on Concepts and Standards Underlying Corporate
Financial Statements, Accounting Principles and Taxable Income Supplementary
Statement No. 4, 27 ACCTG. REV. 427 (1952). Recognition of the different purpose
underlying the accounting standards required by the tax laws should be considered
in any proposal which would allow the substitution of tax accounting principles
for GAAP. If, however, the choice narrows to one of allowing the use of tax ac-
counting principles for required disclosure, or of not requiring disclosure at all
because of the burden caused by requiring small corporations to conform to GAAP,
the former alternative would be preferable.
134 Cf. W. CARY, supra note 11, at 362-63.
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by separate close corporation statutes, 135 that not all corporations need to
be similarly treated. 136 It is not unreasonable to suggest, therefore, that
corporations of different sizes, either in terms of number of shareholders
or asset size, meet different standards of disclosure. For instance, cor-
porations with a larger number of shareholders or greater assets could be
required to prepare their financial statements on the basis of GAAP, while
corporations with lesser assets or fewer shareholders could be given the
option of choosing the method to use. 137 Similarly, large corporations might
be required to have their reports "certified" by an independent public ac-
countant while other corporations could merely include the opinion of an
officer of the corporation that the statements are accurate. 38 Although it
can be argued that this would make disclosure requirements more complex
administratively, and that the line between larger and other corporations
must be drawn arbitrarily, this would be another way to lessen the force of
the argument that the burden of disclosure will fall most heavily on small
corporations with few shareholders to protect.
C. Provision for Waiver
In certain corporations, disclosure would not be necessary. 139 The
clearest example would be a corporation with only a few shareholders, all
of whom are active in its management. 140 As a general rule, corporations in
this category tend to be small both in terms of number of shareholders, and
in terms of assets and complexity of operations. These corporations should
be excused from the requirements of disclosure.
However, rather than deciding that a corporation with an arbitrarily
chosen number of shareholders is exempt from disclosure requirements, 141
release should be affected on a case-by-case basis. Any corporation which
135 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, §§ 341-356 (1974).
136 See Ch. 682, § 7, Div. 1, Ch. 15, 1501, [1975] CAL. LAWS 108 (effective
Jan. 1, 1977, allowing a corporation with less than one hundred shareholders to
expressly waive the requirement of dissemination of an annual report by means of
a by-law); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit 13A, §§ 102, 625 (1974) (requiring the prepara-
tion of an annual report only by corporations with more than twenty shareholders).
137 See notes 129-33 and accompanying text supra.
138 See note 128 and accompanying text supra.
139 The new Arizona statute which goes into effect on July 1, 1976, implicitly
acknowledges that disclosure would be superfluous in some instances by not
requiring corporations with ten or fewer shareholders to make the disclosure
required of other corporations. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-127 (Supp. 1975).
Maine requires only those corporations having more than twenty shareholders to
prepare an annual report. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13A, §§ 102, 625 (1974).
Schulman, supra note 12, at 616-17, proposes the extension of annual disclosure
requirements to any corporation whose securities are "publicly held." He arbitrarily
draws this line at twenty-five shareholders. No corporation with fewer shareholders
would be considered publicly held, although a corporation with more than twenty-
five shareholders could petition to have itself exempted from the requirement.
140 Even where all the shareholders of a corporation are in its employ, however,
there remains the possibility that they will be unaware of all of its operations, and
may still benefit from disclosure. Cf. 1 F.H. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra
note 42, § 3.63, at 89.
141 See note 139 and accompanying text supra.
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seeks to excuse itself from the requirements of disclosure should be
required to obtain the unanimous consent of its shareholders. If it does
not procure this waiver from all of its shareholders, it should be required
-to make disclosure, at least to those shareholders who refuse to waive their
right to disclosure. 142 Some states have allowed corporations to exempt
themselves from disclosure requirements through enactment of a by-law. 143
This procedure, however, continues to leave a minority shareholder at the
mercy of the majority and underscores the need for a unanimous waiver.1 4 4
Once a waiver has been given, it cannot be assumed that the conditions
on which the shareholder relied in making the waiver will continue to exist.
The shareholder should be protected either by allowing him to revoke his
waiver upon reasonable notice to the corporation, or by making the waiver
valid for a limited time with a requirement that the waiver be reestablished
periodically.
The above proposal for required disclosure with the limited exemption
from disclosure procured through waiver protects shareholders of even the
smallest corporations while not unduly burdening corporations where such
protection is unnecessary. Corporations, which legitimately seek to be
excused from the requirements of disclosure can do so with the permission
of their shareholders. Shareholders in other corporations, no matter how
small, will still be protected by the disclosure requirements.
D. Implementation
Disclosure requirements could be implemented under either federal1 45
or state law, but state implementation would be preferable for several
142 The proposal before the Corporate Laws Committee, Buxbaum, supra note 110,
contains a paragraph which would allow any shareholder to waive submission of the
financial statement. Adoption of this paragraph is not recommended by the authors
of the proposal. If the proposal is adopted without this paragraph, every corpora-
tion will be required to disclose.
143 See note 13 supra.
144 In Finberg v. Coin Automatic Laundry Equipment Co., Inc., 54 Pa. D. & C.2d
644, 649 (C.P. Delaware County 1971), a preliminary injunction against the holding
of a shareholders meeting at which an amendment to the by-laws which would
have removed the requirement of sending financial reports to the shareholders was
to be voted on was dissolved. The suit had been brought by a minority shareholder
who owned 29 percent of the stock. The court affirmed the right of the corporate
majority to amend the by-laws to remove the requirement.
145 Implementation under federal law might be challenged on the basis that some
small corporations do not engage in interstate commerce. If this contention is ac-
cepted, federal implementation would be beyond the enumerated powers granted
to Congress. However, the interstate commerce requirement has generally been
accorded an expansive interpretation by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379,
U.S. 241 (1964).
See also 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(1) (1970), which states:
Every issuer which is engaged in interstate commerce, or in a business
affecting interstate commerce, or whose securities are traded by use of
the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce shall
register such security. . ..
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reasons. The federal government has the administrative experience neces-
sary in the SEC to implement such a disclosure program, but the extension
of disclosure, under requirements similar to those now in force, would
result in a greatly increased administrative burden. 46 One method of re-
lieving this burden might be to eliminate the need for small corporations to
"file" their reports with the SEC and only require that they be sent to the
Commission as is now done with annual reports.147 But even that procedure
may be too cumbersome when one considers that more than 99 percent of
United States corporations are not now reporting information to the
SEC.' 48 In addition to this practical limitation, it can be argued that further
intrusion by the federal government into the affairs of small corporations
should be halted, and that states stand in the proper relation to such cor-
porations to implement a disclosure proposal. 149 Although disclosure re-
quirements for large corporations have been accepted as properly within
the federal sphere, other aspects of corporation law have traditionally been
handled at the state level.' 50
Disclosure provisions can be enacted at the state level; 15 ' as a general
rule, however, the vast majority of states have shown a reluctance to enact
provisions of this type, spurred perhaps by a competitive quest for incorpo-
ration and franchise fees.1 52 The correct solution may lie in implementation
through the states, subject to specific minimum standards enacted by
federal legislation. 153 This approach would insure some minimum level of
disclosure without excessive encroachment of the federal government into
the affairs of small corporations, although federal legislation of this type
might also run afoul of the commerce clause.' 5 4
V. CONCLUSION
A large majority of corporations in this country are not compelled to
disclose financial information to their shareholders. In the absence of such
a requirement, shareholders frequently receive no, or at best incomplete,
financial information on the corporations in which they have invested. Non-
disclosure leads to situations which make it easier for management to vio-
late its fiduciary duties to its shareholders and makes valuation of shares
in such corporations difficult.
146 Schulman, supra note 12, at 591-92; see SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 8, pt. 3, at
17, 61.
147 See Kant, supra note 116, at 277, 291; cf. Knauss, supra note 49, at 626-27.
148 See note 8 supra.
149 Schulman, supra note 12, at 588-89.
150 Professor Cary notes,
In the management of corporate affairs, state statutory and case law
has always been supreme, with federal intrusion limited to the field
of securities regulation.
Cary, supra note 23, at 663.
151 See note 12 supra.
152 Cary, supra note 23; Schoenbaum, supra note 26, at 584; Siegel, The Proposed
Michigan Business Corporation Act, 4 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 161, 163 (1970).
153 See Cary, supra note 23; cf. Schulman, supra note 12, at 590.
154 See note 145 supra.
[VOL. 9:256
WINTER 1976] Disclosure by Small Corporations 279
The purposes which led to the enactment of federal disclosure require-
ments for major corporations, and the benefits which justfy their continua-
tion today, apply with substantial force to smaller corporations. The type
and form of required disclosure can be shaped to minimize the force of
arguments which weigh against disclosure.
This article has offered a proposal for required disclosure which would
extend to all corporations, with the exception of those whose shareholders
waive this disclosure. The recognized benefits of disclosure should prompt
states to enact legislation which will ensure that these benefits are enjoyed
by all investors.
-Russell J. Bruemmer
